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EXPERT opinions are crucial in the search for truth during litiga-
tion, but they are also dangerous.' Over the last two decades,
Canadian trial judges have become "gatekeep[ers]," and the rules
of admissibility and evidence have been "progressively tightened."'2 This
progression seeks to guarantee expert opinions that do not meet basic
standards will not be admitted as evidence. 3 Experts who provide opin-
ions have a duty to the courts to "provide fair, objective and non-partisan
assistance."' 4 If an expert is unable to fulfill that duty, then he is not qual-
ified to give an opinion.
5
The dangers of expert opinion evidence have been known for over a
century: "Undoubtedly there is a natural bias to do something servicea-
ble for those who employ you and adequately remunerate you. It is very
natural, and it is so effectual, that we constantly see persons, instead of
considering themselves witnesses, rather consider themselves as the paid
agents of the person who employs them. '" 6 Historically, potential bias
was combated by a dual-mode system where jurors with experience rele-
vant to the facts were selected and individual experts were invited as
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, 2016.




4. Id. at para. 2; GLENN R. ANDERSON, Exm'iwRT EvIDLNCE, 227 (Markham eds., 3rd
ed. 2014) ("[t]he duty to provide independent assistance to the Court by way of
objective unbiased opinion has been stated many times by common law courts
around the world"); National Justice Compania Naviera S.A. v. Prudential Assur-
ance Co., [1993] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 68 (Q.B.) at para. V.B.1 (Eng.) ("Expert evidence
presented to the Court should be, and should be seen to be, the independent prod-
uct of the expert uninfluenced as to form or content by the exigencies of litiga-
tion"). Similar definitions for the duty of an expert witness could be found across
Canada before White Burgess Langille Inman. See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra;
Queen's Bench Rules (Sask.), R. 5-37; Rules of Civil Procedure, R.R.O. 1990, Reg.
194, R. 4.1.01(1); Rules of Court, Y.O.I.C. 2009/65, R. 34(23); Ontario Rules of
Civil Procedure, R. 53.03(2.1); British Columbia Supreme Court Civil Rules, R. 11 -
2(2).
5. White Burgess Langille Inman, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 2.
6. Lord Abinger v. Ashton, [1873] 17 L.R. E.Q. 358, 374 (Can.).
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friends of the court to give neutral testimony.7 This unbiased system
eventually faded away and "professional expert witnesses" became com-
mon.8 Over time, the dangers of expert opinions have become more rec-
ognized.9 The risk that a jury will "be unable to make an effective and
critical assessment of the evidence" has since been acknowledged, 10 as
well as the danger that the trier of fact may defer to the expert opinion
instead of using it to evaluate the facts.11 Furthermore, the risk of "at-
tornment to the opinion of the expert" is increasingly present due to the
challenge that attorneys who are not advanced in a particular field face
when cross-examining experts of that field.' 2 The goal has always been
for the jury to make an "informed judgment" and not make a decision as
an "act of faith" based on the expert opinion.13
II. THE TEST TO DETERMINE ADMISSIBILITY
Since the mid-1990's, the Supreme Court of Canada has created and
clarified the requirements for admissibility of opinion evidence, assuring
"reliability ... and emphasiz[ing] the important role that judges should
play as 'gatekeepers' to screen out proposed evidence whose value does
not justify the risk of confusion, time, and expense that may result from
its admission. ' 14 The Supreme Court of Canadas's decision in R. v.
Mohan'5 established a basic two-prong test for determining the admissi-
bility of expert opinion evidence: (1) the proponent of the evidence must
establish four threshold requirements of admissibility; and (2) if the
threshold requirements are met, then the trial judge must undertake a
cost-benefit analysis to determine "whether otherwise admissible expert
evidence should be excluded because its probative value [is] overborne
by its prejudicial effect."'16
7. See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert Testi-
mony, 15 HARV. L. RFV. 40 (1901).
8. R. v. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, at para. 52 (Can.).
9. See White Burgess Langille Inman, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 18; R. v. J.-L.J., 2000 SCC
51, at para. 25 (Can.) (addressing the risk of admitting "junk science"); id. at para.
55 (Can.) (addressing the risk of not subjecting unproven material that the expert
relied on to cross-examination); R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, 10 (Can.) (recog-
nizing the risk of a "contest of experts" distracting the jury); Masterpiece Inc. v.
Alavida Lifestyles Inc., 2011 SCC 27, at para. 76 (recognizing the risk of the waste
of time and money due to expert opinions).
10. R. v. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624, [2009] 97 O.R. 3d 330, at para. 90.
11. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 10 ("There is a danger that expert evidence will be
misused and will distort the fact-finding process. Dressed up in scientific language
which the jury does not easily understand and submitted through a witness of im-
pressive antecedents, this evidence is apt to be accepted by the jury as being virtu-
ally infallible and as having more weight than it deserves.").
12. D.D., 2000 SCC 43, at para. 54.
13. J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51, at para. 56.
14. White Burgess Langille Inman, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 16.
15. See Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 10-12, 20-25.
16. White Burgess Langille Inman, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 19; see also id.
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A. THE PROPER QUALIFICATIONS COMPONENT
Courts consider the following four factors to determine whether, as a
matter of law, expert opinion evidence is admissible: relevance, necessity
in assisting the trier of facts, absence of an exclusionary rule, and a quali-
fied expert. 17 In cases that involve contested or novel science, courts con-
sider reliability as an additional factor. 18 These requirements provide the
threshold for admissibility-any evidence that does not satisfy them
should be excluded. 19 Evidence that does pass the threshold, by contrast,
moves on to the "second discretionary gatekeeping step." '20
1. Relevance
Expert opinion evidence, like all forms of evidence, must be relevant.21
The court in White Burgess Langille Inman adopted R. v. Abbey's defini-
tion of relevance as "logical relevance.22 To be logically relevant, evi-
dence must "have a tendency as a matter of human experience and logic
to make the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue more or less
likely than it would be without the evidence." 23
2. Necessity in Assisting the Trier of Facts
Courts previously considered whether evidence would be "helpful to
the trier of fact."24 This was no high-hurdle and, while courts did not
seek to impose a strict standard for necessity, "helpful" was deemed too
lenient.2 5 The standard has now evolved to require evidence "be neces-
sary in the sense that it provide[s] information which is likely to be
outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. '26 The evi-
dence provided by the expert "must be necessary to enable the trier of
fact to appreciate the matters in issue due to their technical nature. '2 7
3. Absence of an Exclusionary Rule
Because expert witness opinions are similar to any other form of evi-
dence, any expert opinion must follow all exclusionary rules, statutory or
otherwise, to be admissible.2 8
17. Id.
18. Id. at para. 23.
19. Id. (emphasizing necessity as a threshold requirement should be retained); but see
D.D., 2000 SCC 43, at para. 57 (positing that a higher standard might be neces-
sary); D. M. PACIOCCO & L. STUiESSER, Tin LAW OP EVIDE'NCE, 209-10 (7th ed.
2015); R. v. Boswell, 2011 ONCA 283, 85 C.R. (6th) 290, at para. 13; and R. v. C.
(M.), 2014 ONCA 611, 13 C.R. (7th) 396, at para. 72.
20. White Burgess Langille Inman, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 19.
21. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 20.
22. White Burgess Langille Inman, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 23 (citing Abbey, 2009
ONCA 624, at para. 82).
23. Abbey, 2009 ONCA 624, at para. 82.
24. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 23.
25. Id.
26. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
27. ld.
28. Id. at 25.
2015]
364 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 21
4. Qualified Expert
An expert's qualification requirements stem from his or her duties as a
witness: impartiality, independence, and absence of bias.2 9 Impartial is
defined as "reflect[ing] an objective assessment of the questions at
hand. '30 An independent opinion is "the product of the expert's inde-
pendent judgment, uninfluenced by who has retained him or her or the
outcome of the litigation."' 31 Unbiased means that the opinion "does not
unfairly favour one party's position over another. ' 32 "The acid test is
whether the expert's opinion would not change regardless of which party
retained him or her."'33 That an expert is retained and paid by one of the
parties to litigation is not independently sufficient to undermine any of
these qualities.34 But a proposed expert witness who "is unable or unwill-
ing to fulfill this duty to the court is not properly qualified to perform the
role of an expert," and any testimony from that witness is therefore
inadmissible.35
For an expert's bias to be so severe as to render his or her opinion
inadmissible, "the expert's lack of independence [must] render him or her
incapable of giving an impartial opinion in the specific circumstances of
the case."'36 "[A]pparent bias is not relevant to the question of whether
or not an expert witness will be unable or unwilling to fulfill its primary
duty to the court."' 37 The relevant inquiry, then, is not "whether a reason-
able observer would think that the expert is not independent" but
"whether the relationship or interest results in the expert being unable or
unwilling to carry out his or her primary duty to the court to provide fair,
non-partisan and objective assistance. '38
An expert witness must "be aware of [his] primary duty to the court
and be able and willing to carry it out."'39 An expert witness's impartiality
and independence should not be presumed absent a challenge, but "the
expert's attestation or testimony recognizing and accepting the duty will
generally be sufficient to establish that this threshold is met."'40 If the
expert testifies to this effect, the burden is on the opposing party to show
"a realistic concern that the expert's evidence should not be received be-
cause the expert is unable and/or unwilling to comply with that duty."'41
If the moving party does so, the burden then returns to the party calling




33. Id. (citing P. Michell & R. Mandhane, The Uncertain Duty of the Expert Witness,
42 ALrA. L. REv. 635, 638-39 (2005)).
34. Id.
35. Id. at para. 53.
36. Id. at para. 36 (citing Mouvement laique qu~bcois v. Saguenay (City), 2015 SCC
16, at para. 106).
37. ld. at para. 50.
38. Id.
39. Id. at para. 46.
40. Id. at para. 47.
41. Id. at para. 48.
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the evidence to establish a "balance of probabilities" that this factor is
met.42 If the party is unable to do so, the evidence will be excluded for
lacking impartiality or independence. 43
Trial judges should rarely determine an expert is not impartial and in-
dependent.44 The mere existence of a relationship or connection between
a party and expert witness is not alone sufficient. 45 But a "direct financial
interest" in the outcome of the trial or a "very close familial relationship
with one of the parties" may be of some concern.46 That said, exclusion
at the threshold stage "should occur only in very clear cases in which the
proposed expert is unable or unwilling to provide the court with fair, ob-
jective and non-partisan evidence" and "[a]nything less than clear unwill-
ingness or inability to do so should not lead to exclusion, but be taken
into account in the overall weighing of costs and benefits of receiving the
evidence. '47
5. Reliability
General acceptance of the science at issue is only one of the factors to
be considered by courts.48 Novel science is subject to "special scrutiny."'49
Canadian courts have looked to United States law and Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. as a guide for determining whether an expert's
opinion is reliable in the context of disputed or novel science.50 For that
reason, courts consider factors such as: (1) "whether the theory or tech-
nique can be and has been tested;" (2) "whether the theory or technique
has been subjected to peer review and publication;" (3) "the known or
potential rate of error or the existence of standards;" and (4) "whether
the theory or technique used has been generally accepted." ' 51 Therefore,
a case-by-case analysis "is necessary in light of the changing nature of our
scientific knowledge."5 2
B. DISCRETIONARY COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
Meeting "the basic threshold does not end the inquiry" into the admis-
sibility of expert opinions.5 3 The second prong defers to the trial judge's
discretion "in assessing whether otherwise admissible expert evidence
should be excluded because its probative value was overborne by its prej-
42. Id.
43. Id.




48. J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51, at para. 34.
49. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 9, at para. 32.
50. J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51, at para. 33; See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
51. J.-L.J., 2000 SCC 51, at para. 33 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94).
52. Id. at para. 34.
53. White Burgess Langille Inman, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 54.
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udicial effect."'54 As gatekeeper, the judge should again take "the ex-
pert's independence and impartiality into account when weighing the
evidence" at this step.55 This discretion should be based on a cost-benefit
analysis. 56 Before White Burgess Langille Inman, cases would emphasize
cost-benefit analysis but not explain how it fit into the overall test.57 But
the court in White Burgess Langille Inman noted that the goal of the test
was "to ensure that the dangers associated with expert evidence are not
lightly tolerated" and that "[m]ere relevance or 'helpfulness' is not
enough." 58
It is this discretionary step where "the judge balances the potential
risks and benefits of admitting the evidence in order to decide whether
the potential benefits justify the risks."5 9 Judges should use a sliding scale
consisting of the four Mohan factors in which an expert's opinion must
first meet a minimum threshold of admissibility and then continue to be
weighed against "competing considerations in admitting the evidence."'60
The ultimate decision for the judge to make is whether "the potential
helpfulness of the evidence is not outweighed by the risk of the dangers
materializing that are associated with expert evidence. '61
C. CONCLUSION
White Burgess Langille Inman answered two questions about the ad-
missibility of expert opinion: "Should the elements of this duty go to ad-
missibility of the evidence rather than simply to its weight? And, if so, is
there a threshold admissibility requirement in relation to independence
and impartiality?" 62 The answer to both is yes: "a proposed expert's in-
dependence and impartiality goes to admissibility and not simply to
weight and there is a threshold admissibility requirement in relation to
this duty." 63 If the threshold requirements are satisfied, the trial judge
will consider any remaining concerns "as part of the overall cost-benefit
analysis which the judge conducts to carry out his or her gatekeeping
54. Id. at para. 19.
55. Id. at para. 54.
56. Id. at 19.
57. See White Burgess Langille Inman, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 20; S. N. LEDFRMAN, A.
W. BRYANF, & M. K. FUEIRSr, THE LAW OF EvnDENCE IN CANADA, 788-89,
800-01 (4th ed. 2014).
58. White Burgess Langille Inman, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 21 (quoting D.D., 2000 SCC
43, at para. 46) (internal quotation marks omitted).
59. Id. at para. 24. The discretionary process has been described differently in differ-
ent opinions. See Mohan [1994] 2 S.C.R. at 21 (reliability versus effect); J.-L.J.,
2000 SCC 51, at para. 47 ("relevance, reliability and necessity" are "measured
against the counterweights of consumption of time, prejudice and confusion"); Ab-
bey, 2009 ONCA 624, at para. 76 ("trial judge must decide whether expert evi-
dence that meets the preconditions to admissibility is sufficiently beneficial to the
trial process to warrant its admission despite the potential harm to the trial process
that may flow from the admission of the expert evidence").
60. White Burgess Langille Inman, 2015 SCC 23, at para. 54.
61. Id.
62. Id. at para. 33.
63. Id. at para. 34.
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role."64
Courts thus apply a two-part test to determine whether expert opinion
evidence is admissible.65 First, courts consider whether threshold admis-
sibility requirements-relevance, necessity, absence of an exclusionary
rule, properly qualified expert, and, sometimes, reliability-have been
met.66 Concerns about an expert meeting his or her duty to the court, in
particular his or her independence and impartiality, should be weighed as
part of the qualified expert factor.67 Second, and only if the threshold
requirements have been met, courts carry out their role as "gatekeeper"
and weigh all other factors, including a second look at the impartiality
and independence of the expert opinion, to decide whether to admit and
how to weigh the evidence presented. 68
64. Id.
65. Id. at para. 19.
66. Id.
67. Id. at para. 53.
68. Id. at para. 54.
2015]
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